



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND
2200 LESTER STREET
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5010

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5720
LAWQ
DON-USMC-2015-007043
30 Jul 15

Ms. Rega Reid
16824 Jed Forest Lane
Woodbridge, VA 22191

SUBJECT: FOIA/PA Request DON-USMC-2015-007043

Dear Ms. Reid:

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated June 24, 2015, which requests a copy of "the command investigation into the Personal Information Violations regarding the breach of Personal Identifiable Information that took place at Marine Corps Systems Command, Office of the Assistant Commander for Life Cycle Logistics and Product Support (AC ALPS) around 10 March 2014 by Mrs. Lisa Bristow."

Our review of the documents reveals that they contain personal identifiers (such as names and contact information) of third parties, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Accordingly we must partially deny your request and redact (withhold) this information pursuant to FOIA exemption 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

Please find enclosed a releasable copy of the requested document(s).

Fees associated with processing your request are minimal and waived.

The undersigned is the official responsible for the partial denial of your request. You are hereby advised of your right to appeal this determination with the Assistant to the General Counsel (FOIA) at: Department of the Navy, Office of the General Counsel, ATTN: FOIA Appeals Office, 1000 Navy Pentagon Room 4E635, Washington DC 20350-1000.

For consideration, the appeal must be received in that office within 60 days from the date of this letter. Attach a copy of this letter and a statement regarding why you believe an adequate search was not conducted. Both your appeal letter and the

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envelope should bear the notation "FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT APPEAL." Please provide a copy of any such appeal letter to the MARCORSYSCOM address above.

Any questions concerning this matter should be directed to Mrs. Bobbie Cave at (703) 432-3934 or bobbie.cave@usmc.mil.

Sincerely,

S. A. ALLEN
Chief of Staff



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND
2200 LESTER ST
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-6050

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5000

CIG

APR 02 2015

From: Command Inspector General
To: Commander

Subj: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, HOTLINE COMPLAINT 14112

Ref: (a) Original Complaint email dated 21 Oct 2014
(b) SECNAVINST 5370.5b
(c) MCO 5041

1. Reference (a) was forwarded to Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Command Inspector General (CIG) on 21 October 2014 from (b) (6) MARCORSYSCOM, (b) (6) to look into the following issue; weather (b) (6) failed to maintain control of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) when (b) (6) directed that the administrative assistances remove folders from (b) (6) office that contained PII on current and former employees on or about 10 March 2014 in violation of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5400.11-R, Department of Defense Privacy Program "A loss of control, comprise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition.

2. In accordance with references (b) and (c), MARCORSYSCOM conducted the following action:

- Review DoD Directive 5400.11, DoD Privacy Program, 29 October 2014
- Review of DoD Directive 5400.11-R,
- Interview (b) (6) Acquisition Logistics and Product Support (ALPS), MARCORSYSCOM, Quantico, VA
- Interview (b) (6) ALPS MARCORSYSCOM, Quantico, VA
- Interview (b) (6) ALPS, MARCORSYSCOM, Quantico, VA

3. After reviewing the original complaint, MARCORSYSCOM conducted a preliminary inquiry into whether;

- a) (b) (6) failed to maintain control of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) when (b) (6) directed that the administrative assistances remove folders from (b) (6) office that contained PII on current and former employees on or about 10 March 2014 in violation of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5400.11-R, Department of Defense Privacy Program; "A loss of control, comprise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition."

4. (b) (6) stated that to the best of (b) (6) knowledge (b) (6) doesn't remember who was directed to remove the folders from (b) (6) office. (b) (6) stated that when (b) (6) came on-board (b) (6) had mentioned that (b) (6) wanted (b) (6) office change around and the stack of folders removed from (b) (6) office. (b) (6) stated that one day (b) (6) noticed that the folders were in an empty cubicle but didn't really pay much attention to them. (b) (6) believes one of the contractors had stored them until they could go through them. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) had come into work one day and there were other employees in the cubical looking through the folders. (b) (6) stated (b) (6) over heard someone say that there was PII stuff in these folders and it shouldn't be kept unsecured. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) was asked who put the folders there and who all has seen them, (b) (6) replied "I don't know who put them there or who has seen them." (b) (6) stated that once this issue was brought to (b) (6) attention the files were secured and later (b) (6) believes destroyed. (b) (6) stated that, (b) (6) believes these folders went back several years when (b) (6) was the assistant commander of ALPS. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) remembered what kind of PII information was in the folders and (b) (6) replied, "Only bits and pieces of it - stuff like last four of Social Security Numbers (SSN), some birth dates and performance appraisals. (b) (6) stated there were a couple of credit card statements. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) knew if (b) (6) had knowledge that the folders contained PII. (b) (6) stated (b) (6) wasn't sure since the office was cleared of the folders around the time (b) (6) reported in.

5. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) had firsthand knowledge of the situation because (b) (6) was instructed to remove the files from (b) (6) office. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) remembered when and who directed the removal of the files. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) mentioned that (b) (6) would like to change (b) (6) office around and have the boxes and folders that were left in the office removed before (b) (6) came aboard. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) and (b) (6) took the files and placed them in an empty cubical until they could sort through them to determine what to do with them. (b) (6) stated that once (b) (6) started going through the folders (b) (6) realized that some of them contained PII on former and current personnel. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) remembered what kind of PII information was in these folders. (b) (6) stated "stuff like birthdates, last four of SSNs, performance appraisals, training request and (b) (6) believes credit card numbers." (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) wasn't sure what to do with the PII so (b) (6) started to separate the PII from the junk. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) knew that the contents of the folders contained PII on MARCORSYSCOM employees, (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) didn't think so because (b) (6) said (b) (6) wasn't sure what the folders contained but to have them removed. (b) (6) stated that once (b) (6) realized that some of the folders contained information on MARCORSYSCOM employees (b) (6) informed them of the folders and gave them their information. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) had informed (b) (6) what (b) (6) had discovered and was instructed to secure the files and destroy what was appropriate. (b) (6) commented that (b) (6)

Subj: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, HOTLINE COMPLAINT 14112

had put what (b) (6) could into filing cabinets and started to shred the reminder. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) knew what happened to the boxes of folders that weren't destroyed or secured, (b) (6) stated "no I don't I was moved to another position in April but I believe it all was destroyed after I left for my new position."

6. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) wasn't aware that the folders that were removed from (b) (6) office had contained PII on personnel assigned to ALPS until (b) (6) had brought it to (b) (6) attention. (b) (6) (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) had informed (b) (6) that there was possible PII information in the folders that (b) (6) had removed from (b) (6) office and wasn't sure what to do with it. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) told (b) (6) to properly secure the folders until (b) (6) could go through them. (b) (6) was asked if (b) (6) knew who ordered the files to be removed from (b) (6) office and (b) (6) commented "No - they were left over from the previous assistant commander." (b) (6) (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) thought (b) (6) wanted (b) (6) office cleaned before (b) (6) reported for work so it may have come from (b) (6) (b) (6) stated that once (b) (6) informed (b) (6) that the boxes contained PII on former and current employee I instructed (b) (6) to secure the folders or properly destroy them. (b) (6) was asked if either of these actions took place and (b) (6) replied "to the best of my knowledge it was done." (b) (6) was asked if the command was informed of a possible PII breach and (b) (6) stated "no they weren't." (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) didn't believe the folders had left the government facility so (b) (6) didn't inform anyone.

7. After reviewing the original complaint dated 21 October 2014, MARCORSYSCOM, CIG initiated a preliminary inquiry into whether (b) (6) (b) (6) failed to maintain control of PII when (b) (6) directed that the administrative assistances remove folders from (b) (6) office that contained sensitive information on current and former employees on or about 10 March 2014 violating the Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5400.11-R, Department of Defense Privacy Program; "A loss of control, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where persons other than authorized users and for another than authorized purpose have access or potential access to personally identifiable information, whether physical or electronic." was found **Not-Substantiated**. After interviewing several employees the evidence does show that (b) (6) did request that boxes and folders in (b) (6) office be removed. The evidence shows that, (b) (6) was hired on 9 March 2014 and the boxes were removed on or about 10 March 2014. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) doesn't believe (b) (6) had the opportunity to go through the folders or boxes because (b) (6) was checking in when (b) (6) removed the folders from (b) (6) office. I believe this to be true since (b) (6) attended the HRO check-in the morning of 9 March 2014. The evidence does show that (b) (6) and (b) (6) were responsible for removing the boxes from (b) (6) office on or about 10 March 2014. There is no evidence that (b) (6) had anything to do with the removal of the folder or boxes. The complaint states that (b) (6)

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failed to maintain control of sensitive PII by allowing it to be stored in an unsecured location. The evidence does not support this claim since (b) (6) stated that the boxes were removed from (b) (6) (b) (6) office the day after (b) (6) started (b) (6) check-in. It is unclear what PII information was comprised or subject to unauthorized disclosure. The evidence does show that once (b) (6) realized that some form of PII was disclosed when other employees were seen viewing the folders (b) (6) reported this to (b) (6). (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) did not report this incident to the command because (b) (6) believed that the information was secured and disposed of immediately after (b) (6) informed (b) (6). While it is true that (b) (6) had the responsibility to ensure PII is protected and safeguarded, this is also true for all employees. The evidence shows that not only was this information left unsecured but once discovered by other employees no one reported this matter to the appropriated authorities. (b) (6) (b) (6) stated in (b) (6) original complaint that "No one wanted to report the incident because they did not want the admin ladies to get in trouble and they feared retribution from the director." This supports the lack of understanding by personnel on the proper handling, safeguard and training of PII. Furthermore, this incident happened in March of 2014 and was not reported until October 2014. This only further supports the lack of training and awareness for safeguarding and securing PII. All employees of the command are required to attend Information Assurance and PII training once a year, the command should review its training requirements and establish internal control procedures for reporting potential PII violations both physical and electronic. The command should ensure all personnel involved in the failure to report this PII incident receives training on the safeguard and reporting of PII violations.

8. MARCORSYSCOM considers this case closed.

9. The point of contact at MARCORSYSCOM for inquires related to this matter is (b) (6) at (b) (6) or (b) (6).

(b) (6)



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8. MARCORSYSCOM considers this case closed.

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